…North worst hit by deteriorating insecurity as maiming of innocent soul continue.
Editor -in-Chief MAHMOUD MUHAMMAD kano
Lt Gen. Tukur Buratai (retd), former Chief of Army Staff, has described the reported capture, torture, and killing of Maj. Gen. Rabe Abubakar (retd) by armed criminals as a “dangerous turning point” for Nigeria’s security. His warning: if the current trajectory continues, “ministers, senators, and state governors” could become targets after military officers and civilians.
Buratai said his 2021 prediction that insurgency could last 20 years is “increasingly becoming reality.” His core point: “When a general falls into the hands of non-state actors, it signals a serious erosion of tactical deterrence.” He labeled the situation a “national emergency” and called for radical changes.
Buratai urged government to stop ransom payments and direct negotiations with bandit groups. Security analysts argue that ransom fuels the kidnapping economy. When payment becomes the norm, abduction becomes a business. A clear no-ransom policy, backed by law enforcement, reduces the financial incentive.
He proposed a unified command center with full authority over troops, intelligence, air assets, and logistics in the North-West, North-East, and North-Central. Instead of fragmented state commands, one coordinated body can plan, deploy, and respond faster to threats.
“Soft policing” has not worked against organized, heavily armed groups. Buratai wants sustained, intelligence-led operations targeting bandit camps, ISWAP cells, and Lakurawa networks. This includes air surveillance, night operations, and cutting supply lines for weapons and fuel.
Weapons and logistics don’t move without money and local support. Tracking and prosecuting those who fund, inform, or shelter criminals is critical. Financial intelligence, community tips, and tougher anti-terror financing laws can disrupt the network behind the guns.
Buratai’s line “a general fell into non-state hands” points to gaps in force protection, intelligence, and mobility. Better surveillance drones, real-time intel sharing, armored movement for senior officers, and improved welfare/morale for frontline troops can restore deterrence.
The Sultan of Sokoto’s committee model shows traditional rulers can provide local intel and mobilize vigilantes under military supervision. Funded, trained, and accountable community defense groups act as early warning systems in villages bandits use as corridors.
Insecurity thrives on mixed messages. Buratai’s “national emergency” call implies all levels of government, opposition, and citizens must speak with one voice: no negotiation, no amnesty for hardened criminals, and full support for security forces. Political rivalries should pause where lives are at stake.
“If we do not radically change our approach today, the headlines of tomorrow may make today’s tragedy seem like only a warning.”
The killing of a retired general in captivity has shifted the debate from “managing insecurity” to “preventing collapse of deterrence.” Whether Nigeria adopts Buratai’s hard-line recommendations or a hybrid model, the consensus is clear: delay is no longer an option.
By Mahmoud Muhammad Abuja
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